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RECONNECTING THE MEANS TO THE END: 
A WESLEYAN PRESCRIPTION FOR THE HOLINESS MOVEMENT
Randy L. Maddox
For: Morris Weigelt1
In 1994 Keith Drury had the courage to say publicly what many other insiders have
sensed for some time—that the (North American) holiness movement is dead!2 He immediately
added that the problem was not declining membership. The traditional holiness denominations
have done better than most others on this count. But Drury noted that this supposed success is
one aspect of the demise of these groups as a focused movement. The movement originally
gathered around a distinctive emphasis on holiness of heart and life as the goal for all Christians.
The member denominations now focus more on church growth and on being assimilated into
“respectable” generic American evangelicalism. The clear result is that the characteristic
holiness proclamation of entire sanctification has been broadly abandoned. Indeed, Drury
suggests that any expectation of regenerating transformation in the Christian life (i.e., even
initial sanctification) is becoming increasingly rare.
1This essay is dedicated to Dr. Morris Weigelt, under whom I began my studies as a religion
major twenty-five years ago, and who has been a leader in recent efforts to recover disciplines of spiritual
formation in holiness churches.
2Keith Drury, “The Holiness Movement is Dead,” Holiness Digest 8.1 (Winter 1994): 13–15.
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If the notion of true holiness of heart and life, or Christian Perfection, were only an
idiosyncratic creation of the American holiness movement then the transition that Drury is
describing might be viewed with mere historical interest, or even be evaluated positively as a
return to the mainstream of Christianity. But if the pursuit of such holiness is considered instead
a central ideal of the catholic Christian faith, then this transition becomes another
accommodation to mediocrity in Christian life. As one who shares the second evaluation, I
sympathize deeply with Drury’s concern to find a way to reverse this demise.
But how can such a reversal be best effected? Drury connects the decline in emphasis on
holiness to a period of overreaction against earlier theological and practical abuses within the
movement, which he blames for deflecting holiness denominations from convincing the
generations of preachers and laity now in their forties, thirties and twenties of the positive
importance of entire sanctification. Accordingly, his main remedy appears to be a renewed
emphasis on preaching boldly (and enforcing disciplinarily!) the ideal of instantaneous
conversion and instantaneous entire sanctification.3 I do not consider this prescription very likely
to be effective; my goal in this paper is to explain why, and to suggest an alternative.
I. FOCUSING THE DIAGNOSIS OF THE PRESENT MALADY
Effective treatment of a malady is dependent upon accurate diagnosis of its underlying
causes. As one within the generations in question, who was raised in a holiness church and
trained for ministry in holiness schools, I can confirm Drury’s judgment that most of my peers
shared with me a dissatisfaction with the models of the sanctified life that dominated our
upbringing. But our dissatisfaction was not totally reactionary. For many of us it was precisely
because we had imbibed a conviction of the importance of holiness of heart and life that we were
so frustrated: we sympathized with the goal to which we were repeatedly called, but found the
means typically offered for achieving it to be ineffective. In particular, we sought instantaneous
entire sanctification through innumerable trips to the altar, and then puzzled over why the impact
of these “experiences” so consistently drained away. The reluctant conclusion most often
reached was that the goal was unrealistic, that we were constitutionally incapable 
3See ibid, 15.
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of experiencing it. That is why so many in our generations have let the topic of Christian
Perfection fade from view (and why some are extending similar conclusions to the possibility of
any spiritual regeneration).
In other words, I question Drury’s diagnosis that the increasing neglect of—indeed,
embarrassment about—Christian Perfection in holiness circles should be attributed mainly to a
deficiency over the last forty years in proclaiming the importance of instantaneous entire
sanctification. I would suggest that the deeper cause is instead the very tendency of the
movement to focus the notion of holiness so heavily upon the achievements of such an instant
when one responds to the proclamation. This focus has led to a relative neglect of the equally
essential dimension of spiritual growth in achieving full holiness of heart and life, and of the
various means of grace that nurture this growth.
This suggestion is hardly new. It was advanced over forty years ago by John Peters in
one of the first insider critiques of the understanding of Christian Perfection in the holiness
movement.4 Peters framed his critique by comparing the understanding of Christian Perfection
and its nurture that were current in holiness circles with the teachings of John Wesley. His initial
efforts, combined with a concurrent republication of Wesley’s Works that made these writings
more available to holiness scholars,5 sparked a growing realization of the differences between
Wesley’s model of the sanctified life and that prominent in holiness circles. The outcome has
been mounting calls for recovering Wesley’s richer network of means for nurturing Christian
holiness.6
4See John Leland Peters, Christian Perfection and American Methodism (Nashville, TN: Pierce &
Washabaugh, 1956; reprint ed., Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1985), 184–86. Peters was raised and
trained in the Church of the Nazarene.
5Wes Tracy notes that it was common for those in holiness schools from the 1940s into the 1960s
to complete their training without being expected to read a single page of Wesley (“Foreword,” A
Layman’s Guide to Sanctification, by H. Ray Dunning [Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1991], 10–11).
This began to turn around when the Works of Wesley were reissued by Zondervan (a publisher catering to
holiness circles) in 1958.
6A couple of the clearest recent examples are Paul Merritt Bassett, “Wesleyan Words in the
Nineteenth-Century World: `Sin,’ A Case Study,” Evangelical Journal 8 (1990): 15–40; esp. 30–32; and
Henry H. Knight III, The Presence of God in the Christian Life: John Wesley and the Means of Grace
(Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1992).
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As my title suggests, I share the conviction that Wesley’s heirs in contemporary holiness
churches would benefit from recovering his full model of Christian nurture. But how hopeful is
such a recovery? And what means are most likely to foster it? Answers to these questions require
a further level of diagnosis. In particular, it is important to discern what led the holiness
movement to revise Wesley’s model so drastically in the first place.
In their recent comparative work scholars have identified such contributing factors to the
holiness revisions as 1) the revivalist context of American religion with its emphasis on
immediacy and crisis, 2) the exegetical equation (from John Fletcher) of the baptism of the Holy
Spirit with entire sanctification, and 3) the tendency of holiness preaching to portray inbred sin
as a material-like substance?7 While each of these is significant, as I have puzzled over the
developments I have become convinced that another factor is interwoven among them, perhaps
as a thread that links them together. My interest in this possible interconnecting factor grew as I
sensed how it also helps explain the simultaneous demise of Wesley’s model of Christian nurture
among those American Methodists who rejected the emerging holiness movement.8
This factor, which I am proposing needs greater attention in current attempts to revitalize
the holiness movement, involves the centrality of assumptions (whether explicit or tacit) about
“moral psychology” to both theoretical models of the nature of spiritual life and practical models
for nurturing that life. Wesley’s model of holiness of heart and life was consciously framed
within a very specific moral psychology. I have shown previously that Wesley’s immediate heirs
decisively (though without realizing it!) rejected his moral psychology, opting for an alternative
psychology within which his distinctive emphases regarding Christian Perfection made little
sense. The result was pressure either to abandon the notion of Christian Perfection or to
reformulate it in terms that fit the alternative moral psychology. The ensuing ferment lead to the
split in North America between Wesley’s mainline-Methodist and his holiness descendants.9 My 
7Cf. Melvin Dieter, “The Wesleyan Perspective,” in Five Views on Sanctification, by M.E. Dieter,
et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1987), 11–46.
8Cf. Randy L. Maddox, “Social Grace: The Eclipse of the Church as a Means of Grace in
American Methodism,” in Methodism in its Cultural Milieu, edited by Tim Macquiban (Oxford: Applied
Theology Press, 1994), 131–60.
9Randy L. Maddox, “Holiness of Heart and Life: Lessons from North American Methodism,”
Asbury Theological Journal 51.1 (1996): 151–72.
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earlier analysis focused on this split. I want to extend it now to consider later developments in
the holiness wing of the split. My hope is that consideration of the dimension of moral
psychology will help to enlighten why this wing has reached the present malaise, and what the
most promising agenda is for recovering Wesley’s overall model of holiness of heart and life.
II. THE RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
“Moral psychology,” as I am using the term, refers to one’s fundamental assumptions
about the dynamics that account for human moral choice and action. It involves the range of
possible responses to the questions: Are our options truly open in any sense at the juncture of a
moral choice or act? If so, what hinders us from choosing as we ought? And, what would most
effectively “free” us to choose differently? An awareness of the major alternatives on these
issues will provide an instructive backdrop for our focal topic (relate the following discussion to
the chart in Appendix A).10
One span of options organizing these alternatives focuses on the identification and
relative valuation of the motivating dynamics behind moral choice and action. From the earliest
roots of Western culture this span has been cast in terms of a contrast between the rational and
the passional dimensions of our nature. This casting creates three major alternative valuations:
either one stresses the volitional primacy of the rational dimension; or this primacy is assigned to
the passional dimension; or one insists that authentic volition is more holistic, integrating both
dimensions to some degree.
10Moral psychology was a common academic topic into the nineteenth century. But then
considerations of ethics and psychology rapidly separated, often being defined in contrast with one
another (as normative versus descriptive). This separation has recently been challenged, sparking renewed
serious philosophical and historical considerations of the topic. For a beginning orientation to the issues,
see such books as Norman Fiering, Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-century Harvard: A Discipline in
Transition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Albrecht Diehle, The Theory of
Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); Julia Annas, Hellenistic
Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); and Justin Oakley, Morality
and the Emotions (New York: Routledge, 1992). The following analysis is informed by these and many
other studies. The typology that I suggest is my own, since no standard typology (or terminology!) has yet
been achieved.
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The intersecting set of options that multiplies the range of alternatives in moral
psychology focuses on the nature of the relationship between motivating dynamics and actual
moral volition. At one extreme of this set is the recurrent “determinist” assumption that
motivating dynamics stringently and exhaustively account for human choice and action, a view
that ultimately reduces the will to its motivating dynamics. The starkest possible contrast to this
would be an “indeterminist” insistence on the pure autonomy of human willing, denying any
significant influence or constraint of motivating dynamics upon our moral choices. While
determinists like to argue that this is the only alternative, and rightly dismiss it as incoherent, it
has had few serious exponents. The majority of those reflecting on these issues, being
uncomfortable with determinism, have turned instead to a “self-determinist” conception of the
will. This mediating strategy acknowledges the significant influence of motivating dynamics on
human choice and action, but defends some degree of autonomy for a person’s will as the final
arbitrator of moral volition—allowing us to veto at times even the strongest motives.
When the two sets of options are overlaid, three classic—albeit extreme—alternatives in
moral psychology emerge in the deterministic camp. A pure intellectualist (like some see in
Socrates) assumes that moral action is initiated solely, and necessarily, by one’s rational
conviction of the goodness of an action (wrong actions being attributed to false conviction). In
essence, intellectual conviction is the will, with any felt motives being functions of that
conviction. In stark contrast, a strong naturalist (like Hume at his most rhetorical moments)
insists that what we sense as our will is simply the routine expression of our naturalistic passions
(a term casting our appetites, drives, emotional reactions, and so on as ways we suffer the impact
of our givenness). In this case, any intellectual deliberation involved in moral choice is reduced
to a mere epiphenomenon of these irrational determining causes. Voluntarists (like Hobbes) join
naturalists in denying that intellectual conviction alone is sufficient to move humans to action,
but they are unhappy with the reduction of intellect to a function of irrational passions. They
prefer to talk about the will as the holistic orientation of the person, incorporating a role for the
deterministic impact of rational persuasion within the larger propensities that dictate our choices
and actions.
On the self-determinist side of the typology the focal consideration is less about which
motivating dynamics do influence our moral choices 
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and actions than about which dynamics ought to control these. The broad distinguishing question
is whether humans are assumed to have greater autonomy (and hence moral integrity) in volition
when they: 1) bring the irrational passions under rational control, 2) reject false rational
constraints upon the expression of the passions, or 3) recognize and nurture more holistic
inclinations to action? Within each of the major alternatives framed by this question can be
discerned a spectrum of more subtle differing emphases about what maximizes “freedom” for
moral choice and action.11 On the side of the spectrum nearer determinism are those who view
our inclination to give primacy to the preferred freeing motivational dynamic as natural, arising
almost spontaneously. The only problem, they warn, is that this inclination can be thwarted
(unlike in full determinism), to the detriment of our moral sensitivity and ability. On the side
approaching theoretical indeterminism are those who have imbibed the Enlightenment’s
tendency to equate freedom with casting off all prior influences. They embrace a decisionistic
ideal in which all existing inclinations are viewed ultimately as obstacles to be transcended in the
praiseworthy effort to achieve (fleeting!) moral autonomy. In the tension between these
alternatives stand those who believe that both sides view motivating dynamics in too static of
terms. They insist that inclinations are malleable in nature, capable of being strengthened (or
weakened!) and redirected by purposeful interaction. Their point is that careful habituation of the
proper inclinations will—somewhat ironically—increase one’s freedom from constraints in
moral choice and action.
Thus it is that we have the debates among self-determinists between those who think that
moral integrity and freedom is ultimately grounded in removing any thwarts to our spontaneous
rational control of the
11When determinists speak about our moral choices as in any way free, they define this freedom
in a “compatibilist” fashion. That is, they try to account for our sense of freedom in a manner compatible
with the claim that no other outcome was possible in a given case than the one that actually occurred. For
example, intellectualists argue that a decision is free because it is rational (rather than irrationally
coerced), even though we cannot resist rational conviction. Similarly, voluntarists and naturalists equate
human freedom with having actions determined by internal rather than external factors. By contrast, these
self-determinist debates over maximizing freedom assume a definition that is “incompatibilist,” we are
free only to the extent there is some real possibility (however small) of alternative choice or action.
35
passions (Socrates as others read him), those who emphasize more the need to develop
habituated rational control of the passions (like Plato), and those urging us not to rely on any
inclinations but to assert decisionistic rational control over the habitual and passional
dimensions of life (Kant); all in stark contrast with those who place their hope instead in casting
off the numerous cultural and intellectual fetters upon spontaneous expression of our
natural—therefore, good—passions (Rousseau), those who strive to develop habituated
expression of motivating passions so as to enjoy their benefit (prudent hedonism), and those
who simply call us to bold decisionistic expression of our liberating passions (such as
Nietzsche’s “will to power”); while standing between these two polar camps are those who
locate moral freedom more in owning our holistic spontaneous sentiments (like Hutcheson’s
moral sentiments), or in nurturing holistic habituated virtues (Aristotle), or finally in simple
decisionistic self-assertion (alá Sartre).
Such are the classic philosophical expressions of alternative moral psychologies. In order
to relate Wesley to this spectrum, we need next to consider briefly how Christians have
historically appropriated these alternatives (cf. Appendix B). The initial generation of Christians
were too involved in the struggle for survival to engage in extended interaction with the
philosophical streams of their Greco-Roman context. Even so, one can discern in most of their
writings an uncomfortableness with the fatalism of surrounding religious and philosophical
currents. This became more evident as explicit dialogue with alternative moral psychologies
began. While there were Gnostic flirtations with intellectualism in Christian circles, more
common was Clement of Alexandria’s strong endorsement of self-determinism, in the particular
form of Plato’s emphasis on habituated rational control of the passions.12
This appropriation of Plato’s moral psychology found broad continuing representation in
the church, but it also encountered an influential challenger in the Western church in the person
of St. Augustine. Augustine had struggled and failed in his own spiritual pilgrimage to gain
habituated rational control over his passions. He drew two conclusions from this failure: 1) that
such attempts trust in ineffective human efforts rather than in divine gracious intervention; and
2) that reason is more the slave 
12Cf. David C. Aune, “Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and Earliest Christianity,” in
Hellenization Revisited, edited by Wendy Helleman (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994),
125–58.
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than the master of the passions. The alternative moral psychology that Augustine developed
remains one of the clearest examples of (deterministic) voluntarism in Christian thought.13 He
argued that all human moral choices flow from preexisting holistic affections like love or hate.
As a result of the fall, we are born with bent affections that can give rise only to sinful actions.
Nothing we attempt in our own power can successfully suppress or remove these bent affections.
However, in regeneration God graciously implants (in the elect) new affections that then
naturally manifest themselves in holy living—within the constraints of our present conflicted
situation.
Augustine’s controversial proposal served to highlight that Christian appropriations of
moral psychology must relate this topic to our central convictions about human depravity and the
necessity of God’s redemptive grace. For Augustine, any defense of self-determination stood in
direct conflict with the affirmation that salvation is by grace. Most of his successors have been
dissatisfied with this dichotomous assumption. For example, those who retained the Platonic
moral psychology came to emphasize as strongly as Augustine that even the earliest ability we
have to exert rational self-determination over the troublesome irrational passions (whose
disorder they attribute to the Fall) is a gift of grace—whether a remaining glimmer of the grace
of creation or the most nascent universal expression of God’s redemptive gracious work. Unlike
Augustine, however, they portrayed grace as empowering the self-determining role of our will,
rather than overpowering it.14
While such nuanced approaches to the interrelationship of grace and human effort offered
an alternative to Augustine’s first conclusion, they did not necessarily address the second: his
rejection of the sufficiency of rational conviction to effect moral action. Many Medieval
scholastics simply dismissed this critique, affirming reason as the gracious provision for
inclining us spontaneously to moral action—unless we allow our passions to thwart it. Others
like Duns Scotus, who found this alternative arid and 
13A particularly helpful analysis of Augustine’s moral psychology is James Wetzel, Augustine
and the Limits of Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
14For a good (Eastern church) case in point, see John of Damascus, The Orthodox Faith, Bk. II,
chap. 12 (translated by Frederic Chase as volume 27 of The Fathers of the Church [Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America Press, 1958], 235–36).
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incipiently determinist, used Augustine’s insistence on the subservience of reason to the holistic
will to defend (ironically) a form of decisionistic self-assertion. The more balanced and
influential alternative to both voluntarism and intellectualism in the Medieval church awaited the
rehabilitation of Aristotle, particularly Aquinas’ mature embrace of his model of habituated
virtues.15 Aquinas came to value the way that Aristotle’s model implied an ever deepening co-
operation of God and humanity in the spiritual life, and the way that it made sense of how living
in spiritual disciplines provides persons with a progressive freedom for Christlike action.
Characteristically, the points valued by Aquinas were more commonly feared by
Protestants as verging upon works-righteousness. Some like Luther and Calvin found themselves
pushed back towards Augustine’s voluntarism in the effort to emphasize the priority of God’s
grace in salvation. Other Protestants balked at the apparent loss of human integrity involved in
this move. The majority preferred to stress that God’s unmerited grace restores to believers some
propensity to self-determination, provided that we do not thwart this gracious work. Protestant
scholastics typically focused this gracious transformation in the enlightenment of our mind,
which enables us to restore rational primacy over the troublesome passions; Pietists rebutted that
true liberty is grounded in the holistic sentiments awakened when our hearts experience the
empowering love of God (a model given later influential expression by Schleiermacher). Those
most adamant about self-determination proved ready recruits for the decisionistic emphases of
emerging Enlightenment thought. Only the most fringe groups (some libertines) flirted with a
moral psychology that gave independent primacy to the passions.
III. WESLEY’S “AFFECTIONAL” MODEL OF HOLINESS OF HEART AND LIFE
By virtue of its fluctuating political dynamics, representatives of the full range of
Christian appropriations of moral psychology could be found in Wesley’s Anglican context.
However, the most influential voices at the 
15The issue of Aquinas’s moral psychology, and his apparent move from initial emphasis on
spontaneous rational control to a mature focus on habituated virtues, is a matter of ongoing scholarly
debate. To enter the debate compare James Keenan, Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s
“Summa Theologiae” (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1992) to Jeffrey Peter Hause,
“Thomas Aquinas on the Will and Moral Responsibility” (Cornell University Ph.D. thesis, 1995).
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beginning of his century championed the Platonic model of habituated rational control of the
passions.16 This helps account for overtones of this model in Wesley’s early prescriptions for the
spiritual life.17 It also casts in bold relief the changing emphases that soon began to shape his
mature model of Christian spirituality.
These changes were sparked by Wesley’s personal confrontation with the limitations of
the Platonic model highlighted by the Augustinian tradition. His deeper encounter with this
tradition (via the English Moravians) at the climax of a period of spiritual struggle sensitized
Wesley to the subtle tendency of a preoccupation with human habit formation to eclipse the
conviction of God’s gracious prevenience in salvation. The encounter also reenforced his
growing doubts about the ability of rational conviction alone to effect human volition. But
Wesley could not accept Augustine’s deterministic alternative of voluntarism. And he quickly
became suspicious of the quietist tendencies in the Moravians’ pietistic emphasis on spontaneous
sentiments. So where was he to turn?
Wesley’s way forward turned out to be paved by his embrace of the empiricist turn in
eighteenth-century British philosophy. For empiricism truth is experienced receptively by the
human intellect, not preexistent within it, nor imposed by it upon our experience. In moral
psychology this philosophical conviction led to the parallel insistence that humans are moved to
action only as we are experientially affected. To use a practical example, they held that rational
persuasion of the rightness of loving others cannot of itself move us to do so; we are ultimately
enabled to love others only as we experience love ourselves. The reason for this, they argued, is
that “will” is not a mere cipher for intellectual conviction, nor 
16Two helpful studies that place Wesley in this context are Robin W. Lovin, “The Physics of True
Virtue,” in Wesleyan Theology Today, ed. Theodore H. Runyon (Nashville, TN: Kingswood Books,
1985), 264–72; and Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion
and Ethics in England, 1660–1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
17Perhaps the clearest example is in Sermon 142 (1731), “The Wisdom of Winning Souls,” §II,
Bicentennial Edition of the Works of John Wesley, ed. Frank Baker (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1984ff), 4:
313: “...when due care has been used to strengthen his understanding, then ’tis time to use the other great
means of winning souls, namely, the regulating of his affections. Indeed without doing this the other can’t
be done thoroughly—he that would well enlighten the head must cleanse the heart. Otherwise the disorder
of the will again disorders the understanding.”
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is it a repository of volitional spontaneity, it is a set of responsive holistic “affections” that must
be engaged in order to incite us to action.
Wesley self-consciously appropriated this empiricist-inspired affectional moral
psychology.18 It is reflected in his typical list of the faculties that constitute the Image of God in
humanity: understanding, will, liberty and conscience. “Will” is used in this list as an inclusive
term for the various affections. These affections are not simply feelings, they are the
indispensable motivating inclinations behind human action. In their ideal expression they
integrate the rational and emotional dimensions of human life into holistic inclinations toward
action (like love). While provocative of human action, the affections have a crucial receptive
dimension as well. They are not self-causative, but are awakened and thrive in response to
experience of external reality. In what Wesley held as the crucial instance, it is only in response
to our experience of God’s gracious love for us, shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, that
our affection of love for God and others is awakened and grows.19
This grounding of moral volition in responsive holistic affections shares obvious
similarities with Augustine. It also calls to mind empiricists like Hume who presented the
influence of our passions upon our actions as invincible, thereby undermining human freedom.
Wesley’s way of avoiding this implication was to include among our human capacities “liberty,”
which he carefully distinguished from “will.” While the affections (i.e., the will) responsively
provide our various actual inclinations to action, liberty is our limited autonomous capacity to
refuse to enact any particular inclination. Though we cannot self-generate love, we do have the
liberty to stifle responsive loving! This insistence distanced Wesley’s mature moral psychology
from voluntarism.
18This point is amply demonstrated in Richard B. Steele, “Gracious Affections” and “True
Virtue” according to Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1994); and
Gregory S. Clapper, John Wesley on Religious Affections: His Views on Experience and Emotion and
Their Role in the Christian Life and Theology (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1989). For further
discussion and documentation of the following summary of Wesley, see Randy L. Maddox, Responsible
Grace: John Wesley’s Practical Theology (Nashville, TN: Kingswood Books, 1994).
19This point permeates Wesley’s works. For a few examples, see Character of a Methodist, §13,
Works 9:39; An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, §61, Works 11:70; A Farther Appeal to
Men of Reason and Religion, Pt. I, §I.3, Works 11:106; Sermon 10, “The Witness of the Spirit I,” §I.8,
Works 1:274; and Sermon 120, “The Unity of the Divine Being,” §17, Works 4:67. 
40
To appreciate how his developed views also differed from the model of spontaneous
sentiments (with its quietist tendencies), we need to bring into our discussion Wesley’s interest
in moral “tempers.”20 He drew upon a common eighteenth-century sense of this word to affirm
that our affections need not be simply transitory, they can be focused and strengthened into
enduring dispositions. The capacity for simple responsive love is an affection; an enduring
disposition to love is a (holy) temper. The crucial point for our discussion is that, for Wesley,
God does not typically infuse holy tempers instantaneously. Rather, God’s regenerating grace
awakens in believers the “seeds” of such virtues. These seeds then strengthen and take shape as
we “grow in grace.”21 Given liberty, this growth involves our responsible cooperation, for we
could instead neglect or stifle God’s gracious empowerment.
By now it should be clear that Wesley’s mature moral psychology comes closest to the
habituated virtue model of Aquinas. This made it necessary for him to address repeatedly the
fear that emphasis on forming virtues was a type of works righteousness. His basic rebuttal was
to reiterate the responsive nature of the affections, which requires a spiraling interaction of
God’s gracious prevenience and our responsible cooperation throughout the Christian journey.22
The potential strength of this response was the alternative it offered to the unfortunate tendency
in Western Christian debates of posing God’s agency and human agency as mutually exclusive
in the process of salvation—whether by identifying God’s agency with instantaneous changes
while human agency accounts for gradual changes, linking God with initial changes while
attributing to humans any later changes, or whatever.23
With his mature moral psychology clarified, we need to consider next how integral it was
to Wesley’s endorsement of Christian perfection 
20Cf. Maddox, Responsible Grace, 69–70; and Kenneth J. Collins, “John Wesley’s Topography
of the Heart: Dispositions, Tempers and Affections,” Methodist History (forthcoming).
21Cf. Minutes (2 Aug. 1745), Q. 1, in John Wesley, ed. Albert Outler (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964), 152. See Maddox, Responsible Grace, 178–79 for a discussion of two passages
where Wesley argues that holy tempers can be implanted in a fully mature state.
22Cf. his classic Sermon 85, “On Working Out Our Own Salvation,” Works 3:199–209.
23For some comments on Wesley’s own incomplete recognition of this alternative, see Maddox,
Responsible Grace, 153–54.
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and his emphasis on the means of grace in the pursuit of this goal. This is signaled by the
centrality of the tempers to his understanding of both sin and holiness. In the case of sin, he
insisted that the issue was more than individual wrong actions. He frequently discussed sin in
terms of a threefold division: sinful nature or tempers, sinful words and sinful actions. The point
of this division was that sinful actions and words flow from corrupted tempers, so the problem of
sin must ultimately be addressed at this affectional level. Correspondingly, Wesley’s typical
definition of Christian life placed primary emphasis on this inward dimension, “the renewal of
our heart after the image of [God who] created us.”24 This renewal involves both the enlivening
of our affections in response to the affect of God’s graciously communicated loving Presence
and the tempering of these affections into holy dispositions. Since holiness of thought, word, and
action would flow from such renewal, Wesley could identify the essential goal of all true religion
as the recovery of holy tempers.25
This makes the means of grace central to true religion as well, since Wesley frequently
warned his followers of the folly of seeking the end of holy tempers apart from the means that
God has graciously provided.26 Reflecting his conviction of God’s responsible grace, Wesley
valued the means of grace both as avenues through which God conveys the gracious Presence
that enables our responsive growth in holiness and as exercises by which we responsibly nurture
that holiness.27 Reflecting his holistic psychology, his recommendations to his followers
interwove both means that present rational enlightenment or challenge and means designed to
nurture our affective openness and responsiveness to God’s loving Presence. Reflecting his
appreciation for the variety of ways in which God’s love is mediated, including particularly its
mediation through other persons, Wesley made communal means of grace central to his
movement, rejecting the solitary search for holiness.28
24Journal (13 Sept. 1739), Works 19:97.
25Sermon 91, “On Charity,” §III.12, Works 3:306.
26For three of the best known examples, see Letter to Count Zinzendorf and the Church at
Herrnhut (5–8 Aug. 1740), Works 26:27; Sermon 16, “The Means of Grace,” Works 1:378–97; and Letter
to William Law (6 Jan. 1756), The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley, ed. John Telford (London: Epworth,
1931) 3:366.
27This thesis is ably defended in Knight, Presence of God.
28See Sermon 24, “Sermon on the Mount IV,” §I.1, Works 1:533–34; and Hymns and Sacred
Poems (1939), Preface, §§4–5, The Works of John Wesley, 3rd ed., ed. Thomas Jackson (Grand Rapids,
MI: Baker, 1979), 14:321.
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How close did Wesley hope we could come, through responsive participation in such
means of grace, to the end of recovered holy tempers in this life? He is well-known for the claim
that entire sanctification is a present possibility for Christians. The place to begin unpacking this
claim is to stress that entire sanctification (or Christian Perfection) is not an isolated reality for
Wesley but a dynamic level of maturity within the larger process of sanctification, the level
characteristic of adult Christian life. Since he considered love to be the essence of Christian life
he could define Christian Perfection as “the humble, gentle, patient love of God, and our
neighbor, ruling our tempers, words, and actions.”29 Notice that love is not only said to be
present, it is ruling. God’s love is shed abroad in the lives of all Christians, awakening their
responsive love for God and others. But this love is often weak, sporadic, and contested by
contrary affections in new believers. In the lives of the entirely sanctified Wesley maintained
that it is strengthened and patterned “to the point that there is no mixture of any contrary
affections—all is peace and harmony.”30
Affections contrary to love would be “inward sin.” Wesley believed that this inward sin
was overcome in entire sanctification. In a few instances he described this overcoming as a
“rooting out” or “destruction” of inward sin. As he came to realize, this language is problematic,
because talk of the destruction of sinful affections can connote the impossibility of their return.
By contrast, Wesley became convinced of the sad reality that sinful affections (and resulting
outward sins) may reemerge in lives that had been ruled by love. How could one express the
benefits of Christian Perfection without obscuring this fact? When Wesley was pressed directly
on this point he offered the alternative account that in the soul of an entirely sanctified person
holy tempers are presently reigning to the point of “driving out” opposing tempers (although
these may return).31
At this juncture it is important to remember that Wesley’s focus on affections in
describing Christian Perfection was not intended as an alternative to actions. He assumed that
acts of love would flow from a temper of love. Yet, he also recognized that ignorance, mistakes,
and other human 
29“Brief Thoughts on Christian Perfection,” Works (Jackson) 11:446.
30Sermon 83, “On Patience,” §10, Works 3:176.
31Letter to Joseph Benson (5 Oct. 1770), Letters (Telford) 5:203–4. Note also the definition of
Christian Perfection as “love filling the heart, expelling pride, anger, desire, self-will...,” in Farther
Thoughts Upon Christian Perfection, Q. 12, Works (Jackson) 11:418.
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frailties often distort the passage from affection to action. It was in this sense that he tired of the
debate over whether Christian Perfection was “sinless.” He did indeed believe that it consisted in
holy tempers, but not that it was characterized by infallible expression of those tempers in
actions.
Perhaps the best way to capture Wesley’s affectional view of entire sanctification, then,
is to say that he was convinced that the Christian life did not have to remain a life of perpetual
struggle. He believed that our sin-distorted human lives can be responsibly transformed through
God’s loving grace to the point where we are truly freed to love God and others consistently.
Christians can aspire to take on the disposition of Christ, and to live out that disposition within
the constraints of our human infirmities.32 To deny this possibility would be to deny the
sufficiency of God’s empowering grace—to make the power of sin greater than that of grace.
IV. 19TH CENTURY METHODIST MODELS OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION
The more one appreciates how integrally Wesley’s conception of holiness of heart and
life was framed by his moral psychology, the easier it is to understand how difficult it might be
to maintain this conception if you rejected his moral psychology. As mentioned earlier, this is
exactly the situation in which Wesley’s theological descendants rapidly placed themselves,
particularly in the North American context. I need to rehearse enough of this story to set the
stage for looking at later developments in the (Wesleyan) holiness movement.33
The dismissal of Wesley’s affectional moral psychology by his immediate heirs was not
an isolated phenomenon. The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed some extreme
forms of empiricism, particularly David Hume’s epistemological skepticism and psychological
naturalism. The deterministic implications of Hume’s equation of the will with the passions
called forth strong reactions, most notably that of Thomas Reid. Reid rejected the identification
of the will with the affections (of which he viewed the passions a subset), insisting that it was 
32Note the description of Christian Perfection in terms of taking on the disposition of Christ in
Sermon 76, “On Perfection,” §I.5, Works 3:74.
33Further details and documentation for this section of the paper are in Maddox, “Holiness of
Heart and Life,” 156ff. Note, however, that continuing reflection has led me to distinguish in this paper
variations of what I class together there as “intellectualist” moral psychologies.
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instead our rational autonomy over all stimuli toward action. He allowed to Hume that the
affections are arational, if not irrational, but argued that this rendered them strictly amoral.
Likewise, Reid’s maxim that only intentional acts have moral status led him to depict habituated
tendencies (tempers) as also amoral, if not indeed subversive of truly moral choice, since they
operate with minimal conscious intentionality. With this combination, Reid was sketching out
the decisionistic rational control moral psychology that quickly came to dominate modern
thought!
The rapidity with which Methodists appropriated this moral psychology owed in large
part to the prominence that debates with the Calvinists took in shaping Methodist self-identity
during this period. Central to these debates were the writings of Jonathan Edwards. In his
Treatise Concerning Religious Affections (1746) and later works Edwards developed an
affectional moral psychology remarkably like that of Wesley. The crucial difference was that
Edwards did not share Wesley’s conviction of responsible grace. He allowed humans no
“liberty” to refuse enacting their dominant affections. Rather, echoing Augustine’s voluntarism,
he argued that fallen humanity are free only to sin, and that the holy tempers that account for the
virtuous acts of believers are infused unilaterally by God in their mature state. Edwards’
arguments were so influential that an affectional moral psychology was soon equated with
voluntarism, even among Methodists. As a result, when they took up decisionistic rational
control emphases to rebut Edwards, nineteenth-century Methodists generally did not recognize
that they were moving counter to the course that Wesley had chosen.
The transition toward a rationalist and decisionistic moral psychology can actually be
noticed already in Wesley’s favored coworker John Fletcher, and traced through the influential
second generation British theologians Adam Clarke and Richard Watson. In part because of its
fit with revolutionary and revivalist convictions, this revised moral psychology quickly assumed
dominance among American Methodists. It held nearly official status through most of the
nineteenth century in the moral philosophy texts placed on the required course of study for
preachers, and it permeated the influential theological works of the period. As a result, most
Methodists came to view the “will” as our autonomous ability to assert rational control over our
various motivating dynamics, thereby freeing ourselves to make moral choices. Emotional or
affectional motivating dynamics were assumed to be blind (arational), hence technically amoral 
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in character. Likewise, habits and inclinations were broadly judged to have moral status only
when voluntarily embraced, and often considered more an obstacle to (than a facilitator of) truly
moral action.
Adopting such differing emphases from Wesley’s affectional moral psychology was
bound to impact his correlated conviction that true holiness of heart and life is achievable
through the nurture of a holistic set of means of grace. Indeed, it set off a debate among
American Methodists in which all sides found it necessary to revise Wesley’s model.34
The greatest revisions were by those who stressed most the decisionistic aspect of the
new moral psychology. Within decisionistic models a “virtuous” person is not one who has
nurtured inclinations towards desired moral behavior but one who heroically rises above all
inclinations in an autonomous moral act. Moreover, this validation applies only to that act, and
must be won anew with each subsequent decision. On such terms, it is no wonder that prominent
voices in Methodist circles increasingly characterized “perfect” holiness as simply an ideal to be
endlessly pursued—being achieved, at best, sporadically and temporarily.35
Understandably, other Methodists judged this a betrayal of Wesley and sought a way to
reaffirm the possibility of Christian Perfection within the dynamics of their revised moral
psychology. Some joined Asa Mahan and Charles Finney in insisting that the expectation of a
consistent series of autonomous virtuous decisions is not so unrealistic, given the provisions of
the New Covenant.36 As one Methodist writer put it, “The Christian may, and is required by God,
to be perfect every day of his [or her] life in the sense of keeping the whole moral law as the fruit
of his [or her] regeneration.”37 The specification of regeneration as the basis for this requirement
is significant. It reflects a desire (shared by Wesley) to 
34Myung Soo Park, “Concepts of Holiness in American Evangelicalism: 1835–1915” (Boston
University Ph.D. thesis, 1992) gives a survey putting Methodist developments in a larger context.
35A couple classic representatives are Daniel Whedon, “Doctrines of Methodism,” Bibliotheca
Sacra 19 (1862): 241–74; and Francis McConnell, The Essentials of Methodism (New York: Methodist
Book Concern, 1916), 17–24.
36Cf. Park, “Concepts of Holiness,” 74–76; and J.H. Fairchild, “The Doctrine of Sanctification at
Oberlin,” Congregational Quarterly 18 (1876): 237–59.
37Samuel Franklin, A Critical View of Wesleyan Perfection (Cincinnati, OH: Methodist Book
Concern, 1866), 571. A similar claim can be found in Wilbur Tillett, Personal Salvation: Studies in
Christian Doctrine Pertaining to the Spiritual Life (Nashville, TN: Cokesbury, 1924), 465.
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uphold the expectation of Christian Perfection for all Christians. But it makes this point by
consolidating God’s gracious transforming work in one event, abandoning Wesley’s emphasis on
ongoing responsive transformation by God’s grace. This was possible because these descendants
had set aside Wesley’s conception of the purpose of sanctification as the progressive
transformation of unholy inclinations (tempers) into holy ones. While they recognized that
believers continue to struggle with inclinations to sinful acts, they accepted Reid’s judgment (as
did Mahan and Finney) that these inclinations have little moral status. Indeed, such inclinations
were considered a necessary expression of our probationary situation. The true locus of moral
concern, therefore, is not their amelioration but simply the consistent exercise over them of the
decisionistic rational control that was restored in our regeneration.38
This first defense of Christian Perfection struck many Methodists as overly moralistic.
While they shared the conviction that mature Christians should evidence consistency in their
moral lives, they did not believe that it was a realistic expectation of the newly regenerate.
Rather, such consistency must be developed within the Christian life. This emphasis moved them
closer to Wesley’s model of habituated tempers, but differences reflecting the rationalist tone of
their preferred moral psychology remained (a fact they often acknowledged by disparaging
Wesley’s model!). In particular, they tended to conceive Christian Perfection as the habituated
rational control over our lower (affectional) nature that is developed by repeated practice. The
holism of Wesley’s tempers is missing here, as is the empowering dimension of the means of
grace that correlates to his emphasis on the responsive nature of affections. This helps explain
why they typically restricted interest in the means of grace to those aimed mainly at exhorting
our intellect: sermon, bible study, and prayer.39
There is a third major possible way of conceiving (self-determinist) Christian Perfection
within the rational primacy spectrum of moral
38The most influential articulation of this overall scheme was Merritt Caldwell, The Philosophy of
Christian Perfection (Auburn, NY: Derby & Miller, 1853).
39Major examples of this approach include DeWitt Clinton Huntington, What is it to be Holy?
(Cincinnati, OH: Jennings & Pye, 1898 [first edition, 1869]); Jeremiah Boland, The Problem of
Methodism (3rd ed., Nashville, TN: MECS Publishing House, 1888); and James Mudge, Growth in
Holiness Toward Perfection (New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1895).
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psychology—affirming that Christians are meant to enjoy an enduring spontaneous rational
control over our passions and affections. Since most Christians do not enter such an enduring
state upon regeneration, developing this option would require clarifying what obstructions are
blocking its expression and how they can be removed. Like a river bursting its dam, rational
control would be assumed to flow immediately and naturally thereafter.
Phoebe Palmer’s “altar theology,” with its proposed shorter way to Christian holiness,
contained elements of this approach. In direct contrast with gradual habituation, she argued that
Christians can realize rational sovereignty over their passions (thereby enabling holiness in their
actions) by simply consecrating themselves wholly to God. She often described the resulting
sovereignty in spontaneous terms, as flowing forth naturally. But her intense focus on the human
dimension of consecration created a counteracting decisionistic emphasis on the need to “keep
our all on the altar” by renewing our consecration moment-by-moment.40
Some sympathetic Methodists invoked John Fletcher’s notion of a post-regeneration
“baptism of the Holy Spirit” to balance Palmer’s focus on the human act of consecration.41 They
presented this baptism as “sealing” the Christian’s decisive act of consecration to God. They
hoped in this way to explain how a single act of consecration could induce enduring control over
our lower affectional nature by underscoring God’s empowering role. But in the process they
stirred up a vigorous debate over the need for and/or benefit of such a “second work of grace.”
Representatives of the other approaches to Christian Perfection uniformly rejected the suggestion
that the possibility of true holiness was contingent upon some special gracious gift additional to
our regeneration. They charged that this created a spiritual elitism and lowered the expectation of
holy living for “average” Christians. They also pushed for a specific explanation of what it was
that rendered holiness impossible for the merely regenerate Christian, and how the baptism of
the Holy Spirit resolved this situation.
The explanation that came to define the last major revision of Christian Perfection in
nineteenth-century American Methodism focused on 
40Palmer’s views are best expressed in The Way of Holiness (New York: W.C. Palmer, 1843),
19–38; Faith and It’s Effects (New York: W.C. Palmer, 1845); and Entire Devotion to God: A Present to
My Christian Friend (New York: Palmer & Hughes, 1853). See also Harold E. Raser, Phoebe Palmer:
Her Life and Thought (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1987).
41This reframing of Palmer appears in Nathan Bangs, The Necessity, Nature, and Fruits of
Sanctification (New York: Phillips & Hunt, 1881 [1851 original]); and Randolph Sinks Foster, Nature
and Blessedness of Christian Purity (New York: Lane & Scott, 1851).
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Original Sin. While Wesley had preferred to call the unholy tempers remaining in believers
“inward sin” or “inbeing sin,” he also occasionally used the traditional language of “Original
Sin.”42 In the push to demonstrate their Protestant orthodoxy, “Original Sin” rapidly became the
standard term his heirs used to designate these distorted inclinations of believers’ affections. But
this forced them into a confrontation with the Reidian assumption that inclinations of our
affections are morally relevant only to the degree that they represent the cumulative impact of
our individual deliberate choices (thereby specifically excluding any innate inclinations). A
predictable result of this confrontation was the growing number of Methodists abandoning the
notion of Original Sin. The more significant result, for present interests, is the manner in which
some chose to defend the notion. They specifically differentiated Original Sin from any
inclination of our affections; it became a deeper lying inborn “evil principle,” with distortions in
our affections being among its secondary effects.43
The Methodists who pushed this distinction were those most concerned to champion a
model of Christian Perfection as something achieved instantaneously, subsequent to
regeneration, at the time one receives the baptism of the Holy Spirit.44 They made their case by
using this revised conception of Original Sin to account for the spiritual struggles of new
believers. They argued that the true obstacle to holy living is not wrong inclinations, which
might be defused or reshaped, but this deeper lying evil principle (which they described with
such additional names as the “Old Man” and the “carnal mind”).45 The clear implication was that
neither heroic volitional resolve nor thorough habituation can bring true “freedom” for
obedience. The only thing that will suffice is for this principle to be entirely removed from the
believer’s life. And how is this possible? The core of the final revision was the claim that the
baptism 
42Cf. Maddox, Responsible Grace, 74–75.
43Cf. John Allen Wood, Perfect Love, rev. ed. (South Pasadena, CA: for the author, 1894 [ori.,
1861]), 65; and Wood, Purity and Maturity (New York: Palmer, 1876), 134.
44The pioneering consolidator of this approach was John A. Wood. Other prominent nineteenth-
century representatives include J.H. Collins, Lewis Romaine Dunn, William B. Godby, Samuel Keen,
Asbury Lowrey, William McDonald, Daniel Steele, and George Watson.
45Cf. George Asbury McLaughlin, Inbred Sin (Chicago, IL: McDonald & Gill, 1887); Beverly
Carradine, The Old Man (Louisville, KY: Pentecostal Publishing, 1899); and D.F. Brooks, What is the
Carnal Mind? (Chicago, IL: Christian Witness, 1905).
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of the Holy Spirit—and it alone—effects this removal.46 New believers struggling with unholy
inclinations should be encouraged to move on rapidly to receiving this additional gift of God, not
frustrated with fruitless counsel about nurturing holy character. Those who receive this baptism
will find that, with the obstacle of the evil principle eradicated and the Spirit’s empowering
presence dwelling fully within, spontaneous rational control over their affections will flow
freely.47 
V. TENSIONS IN THE HOLINESS MODEL OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION
This final reformulation of Christian Perfection became the classic model of the
(Wesleyan) holiness movement. Its leading proponents joined to create a national association for
promoting the message of holiness in the late 1860s. This association served from the beginning
as the major point of connection and identity for “holiness folk,” both the shrinking numbers
within long-standing Methodist groups and the growing numbers moving into emerging holiness
denominations. It enshrined the central emphases of the third reformulation in the definition of
entire sanctification adopted in the Declaration of Principles in 1885: 
Entire Sanctification ... is that great work wrought subsequent to regeneration, by
the Holy Ghost, upon the sole condition of faith ... such faith being preceded by
an act of solemn and complete consecration. this work has these distinct elements:
(1) the entire extinction of the carnal mind, the total eradication of the birth
principle of sin. (2) the communication of perfect love to the soul .... (3) the
abiding indwelling of the Holy Ghost .... There is such a close connection
between the gifts of justification and entire sanctification, and such a readiness on
the part of our Heavenly Father to bestow the second as well as the first, that
young converts should be encouraged to go up at once to the Canaan of perfect
love. ... 
46For a demonstration of the growing emphasis on eradication among this group, see Leroy
E. Lindsey Jr., “Radical Remedy: The Eradication of Sin and Related Terminology in Wesleyan-Holiness
Thought, 1875–1925” (Drew University Ph.D. thesis, 1996).
47The classic expression of this is Daniel Steele, Mile-stone Papers (New York: Nelson &
Phillips, 1878), 134: “The great work of the Sanctifier by his powerful and usually instantaneous
inworking, is to rectify the will, poise the appetites, and to enthrone the conscience over a realm in which
no rebel lurks.” Cf. Steele, Love Enthroned (New York: Nelson & Phillips, 1875), 126–27.
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growth in grace thereafter should be rapid, constant, and palpable to themselves
and others.48
The doctrinal statements of the most prominent holiness denominations that emerged
from the American Methodist debates (Free Methodist, Nazarene, and Wesleyan [with its
Wesleyan Methodist and Pilgrim Holiness roots]) stand in clear continuity with this definition.49
Moreover, each group was careful to insure that the distinctive holiness emphases were
represented in the courses of study that they assigned for those preparing for ministry. At first
they relied on works by the original Methodist proponents of the “holiness” reformulation of
Christian Perfection, particularly Daniel Steele and John Allen Wood.50 Eventually a series of
works 
48From Guide to Holiness 76 (1885): 27–28.
49Since the Wesleyan Methodist split predated the solidification of the classic holiness model,
their initial doctrinal statement on entire sanctification (1844 Discipline) is quite generic. However, a
revised article in the 1893 Discipline placed them solidly within the holiness camp. An even more
detailed classic holiness article was adopted in 1968 during merger with the Pilgrim Holiness Church to
form the Wesleyan Church. It was revised again in 1980, but the revisions were mainly stylistic. The Free
Methodists added an article on entire sanctification framed in classic holiness terms to their initial
Discipline in 1860. This article was not revised until 1974, and the major holiness emphases remain in the
revision. Finally, the article on entire sanctification in the Manual of the Church of the Nazarene went
through a series of refinements (each of which heightened its fit with the classic holiness model) from
1898 to 1928, and has remained basically unchanged since.
50To appreciate Steele’s prominence one must compare the section on sanctification in Amos
Binney & Daniel Steele, Theological Compend: Improved Edition (New York: Nelson & Phillips, 1875),
128–34 against Binney’s original edition (Cincinnati, OH: Hitchcock & Walton, 1840), 84–87. Steele’s
revision drops all mention of maturing in grace and adds the “holiness” emphasis on the Holy Spirit
removing inbred sin and bringing instantaneous purity. The holiness commitment of this revision explains
its broad use on holiness courses of study [CN: 1903–36; FMC: 1874–1951; PH: 1919–24, 1946–50;
WMC: 1892–1968]. Other Steele volumes used include Love Enthroned [WMC: 1892–1943], Milestone
Papers [FMC: 1943–51], Gospel of the Comforter (Boston, MA: Christian Witness, 1897) [CN: 1923–36,
1960–72; WMC: 1963–68], and Half Hours with St. Paul (Boston, MA: Christian Witness, 1895) [WMC:
1963–68]. Wood’s Perfect Love was also a mainstay on the courses [CN: 1944–76; FMC: 1874–1951;
PH: 1924–68; WMC: 1911–63], while Purity and Maturity found some use [CN: 1903–11]. Other
prominent Methodist works on the courses include Foster, Christian Purity [CN: 1911–19; PH: 1950–68];
Asbury Lowery, Possibilities of Grace (New York: Phillips & Hunt, 1884) [CN: 1911–60; FMC:
1923–51]; and Dougan Clark, Theology of Holiness (Boston, MA: McDonald & Gill, 1893) [WMC:
1911–43]. Finally, one should mention A.M. Hills, Holiness and Power for the Church and Ministry
(Cincinnati, OH: Revivalist Office, 1897) [CN: 1911–68, PH: 1919–24], which is largely a collection of
quotes from Methodist holiness authors.
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defending the classic model were produced by their own writers to serve as standard texts on the
doctrine of holiness through the 1960s.51
In a technical sense this series of “standard” texts ended with the 1960s because the
various groups terminated the course of study as an alternative to formal education. In a more
fundamental sense, as Keith Drury recognized, texts defending the classic holiness model of
entire sanctification were simply ceasing to be received as standard in the groups. How are we to
account for this weakening reception?
Some might point to the new questions being raised about whether certain elements of
the classic model were true to Wesley, particularly Fletcher’s equation of the baptism of the
Holy Spirit with entire sanctification.52 But this does not seem to be a sufficient explanation.
After all, one could admit that Fletcher (and the holiness model dependent upon him) differed
significantly from Wesley, only to conclude that the difference 
51The most prominent works were Benjamin T. Roberts, Holiness Teachings (North Chili, NY:
“The Earnest Christian” Publishing House, 1893); R.T. Williams, Sanctification: The Experience and the
Ethic (Kansas City, MO: Nazarene Publishing House, 1928); William M. Smith, Bible Doctrines, 2nd ed.
(Westfield, IN: Union Bible Seminary, 1934), 123–39; Zachary Taylor Johnson, What is Holiness
(Cincinnati, OH: God’s Bible College, 1936); Harry Edward Jessop, Foundations of Doctrine in Scripture
and Experience: A Student’s Handbook on Holiness (Chicago, IL: Chicago Evangelistic Institute, 1938);
J.B. Chapman, Holiness: the Heart of Christian Experience, 3rd ed. (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1963
[1941 ori.]); D. Shelby Corlett, The Meaning of Holiness (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1944); Stephen
White, Five Cardinal Elements in the Doctrine of Entire Sanctification (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill,
1948); George Allen Turner, The More Excellent Way (Winona Lake, IN: Light & Life, 1952; expanded
reprint as The Vision Which Transforms [Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1964]); W.T. Purkiser,
Conflicting Concepts of Holiness (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1953); Stephen White, Eradication:
Defined, Explained, Authenticated (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1954); J. Paul Taylor, Holiness: the
Finished Foundation (Winona Lake, IN: Light & Life Press, 1963); Richard Taylor, Life in the Spirit:
Christian Holiness in Doctrine, Experience and Life (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1966); and Roy
Stephen Nicholson, True Holiness: The Wesleyan-Arminian Emphasis (Oswosso, MI: Oswosso College,
1967).
52The early 1970s witnessed a vigorous debate over this topic among holiness scholars and a
growing awareness that Wesley did not agree with Fletcher. For a brief bibliographical survey of this
debate and an analysis of the interchange between Wesley and Fletcher, see Donald W. Dayton,
Theological Roots of Pentecostalism (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1987), 48–54, 184–85. The clearest
evidence of Wesley’s rejection of Fletcher’s proposal has since been unearthed and discussed in M.
Robert Fraser, “Strains in the Understandings of Christian Perfection in Early British Methodism”
(Vanderbilt University Ph.D. thesis, 1988), 382–86, 490–92.
52
was an improvement upon Wesley.53 Indeed, this judgment seems implicit from the beginning in
the courses of study of our focal holiness churches, which balance limited assignments of
Wesley (at most his Plain Account of Christian Perfection and some sermons54) with exposure to
Fletcher’s refocusing of entire sanctification upon the baptism of the Holy Spirit!55
This leads me to suggest that the uneasiness undermining confidence in the classic
holiness model of entire sanctification was more general in nature. I believe that the weakening
reception reflected a growing awareness of inadequacies in the moral psychology upon which
the model had been framed. To make this case I will compare three central aspects of Wesley’s
moral psychology with that evident in the standard holiness treatments, highlighting the
instabilities that repeatedly emerge in the holiness case.56
53See this very argument in J. Kenneth Grider, A Wesleyan-Holiness Theology (Kansas City, MO:
Beacon Hill, 1994), 15.
54Free Methodists through the history of their course of study (1860–1951) listed Wesley’s
Sermons and Plain Account. The Wesleyan Methodists added to their course (begun in 1867) the Plain
Account in 1883 and the Sermons in 1900, carrying both until the course ended in 1968. The Pilgrim
Holiness had both listed on their course in 1916 (the first I have located), but dropped the Sermons by
1919 and the Plain Account by 1942. The Church of the Nazarene included the Plain Account
sporadically through the history of its course (1903–76), while never listing the entire set of Sermons,
choosing instead to assign select sermons focusing on holiness: from 1905–15 they assigned Wesley’s
Sermons (Boston, MA: Christian Witness, 1903) [which contains the sermons numbered in Works as 13,
14, 40, 43 & 83], from 1915–32 they assigned Wesley’s Sermons: Ten Select Sermons (Kansas City, MO:
Publishing House of the Church of the Nazarene, 1915) [which adds sermons 39, 49, 80, 82 & 91], and
from 1960–68 assigned The Heart of Wesley’s Faith (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1961) which bound
the Plain Account with his sermon “The Scripture Way of Salvation.”
55This might not be evident on casual consideration. Fletcher’s Works (New York: Lane & Scott,
1849) are found only on the FM course from 1860–87; and his Checks on CN from 1948–60. However
one must add to this the listings of Thomas Ralston’s Elements of Divinity (Louisville, KY: E. Stevensen,
1847), whose chapter dealing with sanctification simply reprints a portion of Fletcher’s last Check [CN:
1919–40; FMC: 1870–78, 1887–1951; PH: 1924–50; WMC: 1931–55].
56Bruce Eugene Moyer has recently argued for the continuing similarities between Wesley and
the American holiness movement on the doctrine of Christian Perfection in “The Doctrine of Christian
Perfection: A Comparative Study of John Wesley and the Modern American Holiness Movement”
(Marquette University Ph.D. thesis, 1992). The similarities he cites are quite general in nature and do not
go to the level of moral psychology, where I am highlighting instead differences. Part of the reason for
this is that Moyer relies heavily in his account of Wesley on secondary studies by holiness scholars (esp.
Leo Cox). It is little wonder that he finds this Wesley matching holiness emphases.
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A. Instability over the Relationship of Divine and Human Agency in Sanctification
One central aspect of Wesley’s affectional moral psychology was his emphasis on the
responsive nature of the affections. We noted above the way that this allowed him to interrelate
dynamically God’s gracious prevenience and our responsible cooperation throughout the
Christian journey. By contrast, the American Methodist switch to a Reidian moral psychology
pushed them back toward the Western Christian tendency of posing God’s agency and human
agency as mutually exclusive in the process of salvation. Holiness writers did not escape this
impact. It is evident already in Beverly Carradine’s fiery charge that anyone who teaches a
growth theory of sanctification “uncrowns Christ, robs him of his peculiar glory of sanctifying
the Church ... and transforms what is recognized in the Bible as a divine work into a mere
evolution or development.”57 The obvious assumption is that all divine work is instantaneous,
while any gradual work must be merely natural (or human). Turning this assumption around,
holiness writers developed sophisticated accounts of what part of sanctification is God’s work
(hence, instantaneously perfect) and what part remains our responsibility (hence, gradual and
fallible).58 But here the instability became apparent. To the degree that they emphasized God’s
work of unilaterally removing inbred sin, holiness advocates verged upon a monergistic
soteriology that could encourage quietism.59 To the degree that they tried to protect against
quietism by emphasizing our responsibility, they verged upon the Pelagian suggestion of
autonomous human abilities.60 The difficulty of finding ways within their assumptions to
emphasize the primacy of God’s grace without undercutting human responsibility has continued
to plague the movement.61
57Carradine, Old Man, 148.
58A good example is R.T. Williams, Sanctification, esp. 23, 43, 51. 
59This irony is highlighted in Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, Foundations of Wesleyan-Arminian
Theology (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1967), 77–78.
60Cf. the evaluation of A.M. Hills in Paul Merrit Bassett, “A Study in the Theology of the Early
Holiness Movement,” Methodist History 13.3 (1975): 61–84; and Otho Jennings’ stress on the need to
“will to be holy” in “Areas of Growth After Sanctification,” in Further Insights into Holiness, edited by
Kenneth Geiger (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1963), 141–60, see 151–52.
61As a recent example, note the ironic defeat at the 1989 Nazarene General Conference of the
motion that the article entitled “Free Agency” in their Manual be retitled “Free Grace”; recorded in the
Journal of the Twenty-Second General Assembly of the Church of the Nazarene, edited by B. Edgar
Johnson (Kansas City, MO: Nazarene Publishing House, 1989), 40, 257.
54
B. Instability over the Role of Emotions in Motivating Holiness
A second central aspect of Wesley’s moral psychology is his valuing of the affections as
holistic motivating inclinations. Despite its vigorous claims to be defending Wesley, the contrast
with the classic holiness model is again stark. For example, it is hard to imagine a stronger
expression of the alternative rational control commitment in moral psychology than A.M. Hills’
charge that Christians must “enthrone the rational and the moral in our lives, over the
incitements of appetite and passion, and thus escape the doom of being the passive victim of
impulses to evil.”62 What Hills calls for is precisely what standard holiness treatments described
as the result of entire sanctification: “the readjustment of our whole nature whereby the inferior
appetites and propensities are subordinated and the superior intellectual and moral powers are
restored to their supremacy.”63 The rationalist lean of the classic model becomes even more
evident when one notes their frequent concern to ensure that the act of consecration leading to
this restored balance is not based primarily on emotion! When William McDonald (a Methodist
pioneer of the movement) would provide the exhortation following a rousing sermon on the need
for sanctification, for example, he would purposefully avoid further emotional appeal, choosing
instead in his “cool, deliberate way” to expound his favorite topics: “reason and faith—reason,
the ground-work of all religious obligation and faith the most reasonable thing in the whole
universe.”64 And then there is the repeated advice not to trust one’s
62A.M. Hills, Fundamental Christian Theology, 2 vols. (Pasadena, CA: C.J. Kinne, 1931), 1: 362.
This strong rational control model remains evident in G.B. Williamson’s preface to Lauriston J. DuBois,
Guidelines for Conduct (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1965), 4.
63John P. Newman, “The Law of Purity,” in Our Holy Faith (a textbook prepared for Asbury
College), edited by T.M. Anderson (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1965), 219–20. See also Chapman,
Holiness, 19; Corlett, Meaning of Holiness, 33, 87–88; and W.T. Purkiser’s chapters on sanctification in
Exploring Our Christian Faith, edited by W.T. Purkiser (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1960), 350–89.
64See the report on his exhortation in A Modern Pentecost: Embracing a Record of the Sixteenth
National Camp-Meeting for the Promotion of Holiness, held at Landisville, PA., July 23d to August 1st,
1873, edited by Adam Wallace (Reprint ed., Salem, OH: Schmul, 1970), 128–30. Note also the comments
on evangelism by Joseph H. Smith (chief expositor for the National Holiness Association in the early
twentieth century) in Delbert Rose, A Theology of Christian Experience: Interpreting the Historic
Wesleyan Message (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany Fellowship, 1965), 121.
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feelings in determining whether one has obtained entire sanctification. As John Church put it:
“your feeling will fluctuate but thank God that does not have to be true of your spiritual state. ...
The fact that you are in Jesus Christ is a fact that was established by a deliberate choice of your
will, and that fact can only be changed in one way, and that is by a choice of your will.”65 While
it may not fit the “holy roller” stereotype, a distrust of the emotional/affectional dimension of
human life is strung through all of these dimensions. Unlike Wesley’s more holistic
commitments, reason is cast over against “blind” emotion, and affectivity is equated with passive
domination by controlling impulses. The result has been an ongoing instability in the holiness
movement concerning the legitimate role of emotion in Christian life, with the ever present
danger of settling for either an “enthusiastic” emotionalism or a “passionless” moralism.66
C. Instability over the Relationship of Purity and Maturity in Christian Perfection
The third central aspect of Wesley’s moral psychology that provides instructive
comparison is his stress on the freedom that comes as affections are shaped into enduring
tempers. By contrast, we noted that the pioneers of the classic holiness model argued that the
baptism of the Spirit provides spontaneous rational control. The later tradition has frequently
echoed this claim, but it has also found it to be another unstable position to hold. Consider a
representative quote from Richard Taylor in the mid-1960s: 
The Spirit-filled believer loves God with all his heart, soul, mind, and strength
and his neighbor as himself. This is the glad inner quality and spontaneous
outflow of his life. He has been purged (even in the subconscious) from
bitterness, rebelliousness toward God, hatred, envy, covetousness, and worldly-
mindedness. He is now conscientious, spiritually-minded, Christ-centered, and is
reaching for more and more of God. But his personality may not yet be a good
vehicle of the love within.67
65John R. Church, Earthen Vessels (Louisville, KY: Pentecostal Publishing Co., 1942), 46–47.
Church was a holiness evangelist within the MECS.
66Read in this light Victor Paul Reasoner’s The Hole in the Holiness Movement (Evansville, IN:
Fundamental Wesleyan Publishers, 1991); and “The American Holiness Movement’s Paradigm Shift
Concerning Pentecost,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 31.2 (1996): 132–46.
67R.S. Taylor, Life in the Spirit, 153.
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Notice the qualifying “but” that begins the last sentence. Apparently the outflow of love
is not always as spontaneous as the emphasis on the impact of the baptism of the Spirit initially
suggests. But how could this be, if the person now enjoys Christian Perfection? The standard
answer to this question that emerged in holiness circles was to contrast “purity” and “maturity”
in the Christian life. Christian Perfection became a state of simple purity entered instantaneously
when all evil inclinations are destroyed, allowing nascent holy inclinations to emerge. Maturity
was identified with the subsequent entrenching of these holy inclinations.68
This distinction raises as many issues as it was meant to solve. To begin with, it
correlated Christian Perfection with the beginning of developing Christian character, while
Wesley had clearly related the term (in its more natural sense) to those of mature character who
manifest the full disposition of Christ.69 Secondly, the distinction could be used mainly to defend
the newly sanctified as already perfect, rather than for stressing the importance of subsequent
maturation.70 This was particularly the case if one enlarged Wesley’s list of what perfection in
love did not include to explain how someone was “perfect” who had remaining prejudices,
temperament problems, etc.71 Thirdly, the distinction constitutes another 
68This model was first framed in Wood, Purity and Maturity, 26–32. A more nuanced distinction
can be found in Steele, Love Enthroned, 126–27 (but see also 44). Wood’s formulation became the
standard endlessly repeated in the later movement.
69Note this admission within the valiant attempt of Leo Cox to demonstrate Wesleyan precedent
for holiness theology, in John Wesley’s Concept of Perfection (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1964), 89.
70The history of this distinction in the Nazarene Manual is an interesting case in point. Its
introduction into the article on Entire Sanctification in 1911 (significantly, in terms of a contrast between
a perfect heart and perfect character) appears primarily motivated as a defense of the claim for Christian
“perfection.” This concern carries over as it is moved to a footnote on the article in 1923. It is moved
again and expanded in 1928 into a distinct Special Rule on Growth in Grace. Now members are exhorted
to give careful attention to developing maturity, but the only stated rationale is that lack of doing so is
undercutting the church’s holiness testimony! Finally, in 1976 the distinction is moved back into the
statement on Entire Sanctification (now as a distinction between a pure heart and mature character) and
this time the warning about impaired witness is finally subordinated to a stress that failure to nurture
maturity frustrates and eventually forfeits the gracious transformation that holiness is meant to provide.
71For some examples of such debatable enlargement, see Church, Earthen Vessels, 50; Lewis T.
Corlett, “Holiness and Nervous Reactions,” in Further Insights into Holiness, 333–49; and J. Kenneth
Grider, “Carnality and Humanity: Exploratory Observations,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 11 (1976):
81–91.
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instance of counterpoising divine and human action: proponents typically discounted all human
efforts to reshape evil inclinations into holy ones prior to the unilateral eradicating work of the
Holy Spirit; but they could be quite rigorous about the need for human discipline in shaping holy
habits after entire sanctification.72 Finally, the distinction effectively conceded a revision of the
original model from “spontaneous” to “habituated” rational control. The only difference from the
earlier Methodist alternative of habituated rational control was that a second discrete act of
divine transformation was prescribed as necessary before habituation could begin.
Of course, whatever issues the distinction between purity and maturity raised within the
classic holiness model, there was a greater challenge for those who overlooked or denied it.73
They were forced to explain how the newly sanctified did consistently express Christian
Perfection. Most fell back upon Phoebe Palmer’s decisionistic suggestion about the moment-by-
moment nature of sanctification and the need to “keep the blessing.”74
D. Impact upon the Role of the Means of Grace in the Sanctified Life
With such instabilities in mind, we are at the point to consider how the holiness moral
psychology affected their conception of the contribution of the means of grace to the sanctified
life. As we saw earlier, the means of grace were central to Wesley’s model of holiness of heart
and life. He relied upon them both as the ordinary avenues through which God conveys gracious
transforming power and as trustworthy exercises by which we responsibly form holy tempers.
Neither role carried through into the holiness movement smoothly.
72The best example is again Richard Taylor, this time his book The Disciplined Life (Kansas City,
MO: Beacon Hill, 1962), esp. 22, 26–27, 50–55. See also T.W. Anderson, After Sanctification: Growth in
the Life of Holiness (Kansas City, MO: Nazarene Publishing House, 1929); Lyman F. Lance, Soul Habits
(Colfax, NC: Lyman F. Lance, 1942); and Mary Alice Tenney, Blueprint for a Christian World: An
Analysis of the Wesleyan Way (Winona Lake, IN: Light & Life Press, 1953).
73Ironically, John Allen Wood increasingly played down the distinction in the midst of battles
over instantaneous sanctification. In particular, in the revised edition of Perfect Love (1894) he argued
that the eradication of the principle of sin from the human heart “completes” the Christian character (34),
and identified the newly sanctified as not just spiritual babes but adults (228). The first addition of Perfect
Love (1861) had been much less antagonistic to growth in grace (see 19, 29).
74For a convenient collection of the typical advice on how to keep the blessing, see Hills,
Holiness and Power, 344–65. Also typical is Theodore Ludwig, The Life of Victory: or Saved, Sanctified
and Kept (Kansas City, MO: Nazarene Publishing House, 1929), esp. 68–87.
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Consider first the means of grace as mediators of gracious transforming power. The
crucial issue here is not whether any means can convey power, but what type of means can do so
(and do so most effectively). Wesley’s holistic convictions led him to value both means of grace
that primarily address the intellect and means that are focused more on our emotional/affective
nature. He purposefully developed a balanced network of these for his followers. To the degree
that the initial campmeetings and prayer groups functioned as alternative “intense” communities
over against the emerging routinization of Methodist church life, this balance may have existed
in practice in the early holiness movement.75 But these gatherings soon took on a routine of their
own that embodied the rationalist assumptions reflected in Luther Lee’s justification of Christian
worship and communal life: “Christianity requires us to maintain rational and pure Christian
fellowship ... mutual watch care, instruction and support ... regular and orderly assemblies for
public worship ... [and] healthy moral discipline.”76 These assumptions also worked more
broadly, such that the typical means of grace recommended in holiness works came to align
solidly on the intellectual side of the spectrum. About the only means recommended for
obtaining entire sanctification was attendance at meetings where one would be challenged to
make the appropriate consecration, and the most common means recommended for nurturing
growth after entire sanctification were Bible reading, prayer, holiness literature, testifying to
your experience, and aggressively maintaining your rational commitment to grow.77 The fracture
of Pentecostalism off of the 
75Cf. A. Gregory Schneider, “A Conflict of Associations: The National Camp-Meeting
Association for the Promotion of Holiness versus the Methodist Episcopal Church,” Church History 66
(1997): 268–83.
76Luther Lee, Elements of Theology (Syracuse, NY: Wesleyan Methodist Publishing House, 1865
[1856 ori.]), 486–87. While Lee predates the classic model he was influential on the course of study
[FMC: 1866–70, 1891–99; WMC: 1867–1911, 1923–31].
77Hills, Holiness and Power, 344–65; Edgar P. Ellyson, Theological Compend (Chicago, IL:
Christian Witness, 1908), 125; C.W. Ruth, Temptations Peculiar to the Sanctified (Kansas City, MO:
Nazarene Publishing House, 1928), 41–44; Rose, Theology of Christian Experience, 234; William S.
Deal, The Victorious Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1954); Allan Coppedge, “Holiness and
Discipleship,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 15.2 (1980): 80–97; and the recently reprinted example
from ca. 1915 by Warren McIntire, “The Place of the Will in Christian Experience,” Holiness Digest 11.1
(Winter 1997): 22.
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early holiness shoot was an almost inevitable reaction to this trend, and left both groups
searching for a more holistic balance.78
The role of means of grace as exercises to strengthen and shape Christian character was
also rendered problematic by the fluctuating assumptions of the holiness movement. To the
degree that the spontaneous rational control model held, there was little perceived need for this
role. The emphasis was on how a changed heart naturally works its way out into life, rather than
on how “external” exercises help change the heart.79 Likewise, those opting for the decisionistic
model of moment-by-moment renewed consecration placed little stress on formative disciplines.
Even those most emphatic on the need for habituation after entire sanctification typically put
more stress on our duty to form holy habits than on how formative means of grace might help
this process.80 More significantly, they tended to recast the very use of such means into an issue
primarily of “duty.”81
Consider the example of Wesley’s “General Rules” for his Methodist societies, which he
encapsulated in a three-fold injunction: do no harm, do as much good as you can, and attend all
the ordinances of God. Stated so baldly these can look like a moralistic list of qualifications for
membership. However Wesley’s primary intention in prescribing them was formative. They
were designed for those who may not even have an assurance of justification yet, just a “desire
of salvation.” They sketched out the disciplines that Wesley believed would bring assurance and
transform their lives, if routinely followed.82 Even works of mercy to others were enjoined not
simply because this was “right,” but because engaging in 
78Cf. Charles Edwin Jones, “Tongues-Speaking and the Wesleyan-Holiness Quest for Assurance
of Sanctification,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 22.2 (1987): 117–24; and Henry H. Knight III, “From
Aldersgate to Azusa: Wesley and the Renewal of Pentecostal Spirituality,” Journal of Pentecostal
Theology 8 (1996): 82–98.
79Cf. Wood, Purity and Maturity, 135; Steele, Love Enthroned, 44; and R.T. Williams,
Sanctification, 64–65.
80Cf. Anderson, After Sanctification, 16; and Lance, Soul Habits.
81For just a couple of the clearest expressions of this, see Lee, Elements of Theology, 344–63; and
J.B. Chapman, Holiness, 48.
82Cf. Helmut Nausner, “The Meaning of Wesley’s General Rules: An Interpretation,” Asbury
Theological Journal 44.2 (1989): 43–60; and David Lowes Watson, “Aldersgate Street and the General
Rules: The Form and the Power of Methodist Discipleship,” in Aldersgate Reconsidered, edited by R.L.
Maddox (Nashville, TN: Kingswood, 1990), 33–47.
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such acts serves reciprocally to nurture the actor’s Christian character (holy tempers).83
Each of the holiness groups coming out of Methodism brought over the General Rules
into their Disciplines, but it soon became clear that these rules functioned very differently in
their context. This difference can be sensed in the way the General Rules were revised in the first
Manual of the Church of the Nazarene. To begin with, the target audience for the rules was
changed from those “desiring salvation” to those who are seeking to be “saved from all sin” (i.e.,
entirely sanctified). Then the opening to the first section was altered by dropping the first three
words (do no harm) and beginning with Wesley’s next clause “avoid evil of every kind.” While a
slight change, it shifts the tone from a concern not to harm one’s self or others to a concern to
stay separate from anything that might contaminate you or call your “witness” into question. The
second set of injunctions (do as much good as you can) was recast under the framework of “do
that which is enjoined in the Word of God.” While there were still some specifics cited that
involved helping others, the emphasis shifted to the importance of obedience. This is particularly
significant because Wesley’s third instruction about attending the means of grace was subsumed
into this section, and thereby rendered primarily a matter of obedience. Meanwhile a new third
section was added which warned that those who want to remain members must not inveigh
against the doctrines or usages of the church!84
What is suggested in these revisions can be demonstrated in a variety of historical
developments within the holiness movement.85 Disciplinary guidelines largely ceased to be
appreciated as formative exercises, becoming instead boundary markers for defining proper
holiness lifestyles, or marks of distinction to “testify to the world,” or even simple tests of the
submission of members to God’s authority (as embodied in 
83Cf. Sermon 92, “On Zeal,” §II.5, Works 3:313.
84The revised rules are listed on 28–30 of the first Manual (1898). They carry down with only
minor additions until 1976, when the first and second sections swap places and the language of third
section is modified slightly.
85See especially the perceptive study of Paul Merritt Bassett, “Culture and Concupiscence: the
Changing Definition of Sanctity in the Wesleyan Holiness Movement, 1867–1920,” Wesleyan
Theological Journal 28 (1993): 59–127.
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the church).86 A major reason for this change was the holiness assumption that human efforts at
reform are fruitless prior to the baptism of the Holy Spirit, and obedience largely spontaneous
after the baptism. On these terms observation of disciplinary rules (including the rule of
attending the various means of grace!) is mainly a way of demonstrating externally that this
internal change has already taken place.87 And since it is not assumed to do anything for you, the
natural tendency is to begin to question the rationale for particular items on the list, as well as
how often we have to do them. This goes a long way to explaining the difference in Wesley’s
practice of regular Eucharist and that of the typical holiness church!
VI. RECONNECTING THE MEANS TO THE END
In light of all that we have seen, let me return to the opening question of this paper: What
accounts for the present malaise in the holiness movement about the importance and possibility
of Christian Perfection, and how can this be overcome? I have tried to show that Wesley’s
answer would be that the movement is reaping the results of continuing to demand that their
members attain this spiritual goal while failing to provide for them the full range of the
graciously-provided means for nurturing true holiness of heart and life. Their predictable failure
to reach such holiness, apart from these means, has naturally led them to question the goal itself.
Wesley would then press to the level of the changed conception of Christian Perfection that
rendered most of these means either superfluous or mere duties. Ultimately, he would challenge
the adequacy of the rationalist and decisionistic emphases of the modern Reidian moral
psychology, which the holiness movement has broadly adopted.
86Thus, in 1951 when the Free Methodists reaffirmed the General Rules their justification was
that rules are essential for witness individually and corporately, and help give clear-cut boundaries for
guidance; see the Report of the Committee on Principle and Precedent in the (manuscript) Journal of
Record of General Conference, 1923–55, 825 (at archive center in Indianapolis). For comments on
similar rationale among Nazarenes, see H. Ray Dunning, “Nazarene Ethics as Seen in a Theological,
Historical and Sociological Context” (Vanderbilt University Ph.D. thesis, 1969), 53, 76–78.
87Note the use of precisely this language in DuBois’ attempt to explain and defend the place for
observing the (Nazarene) General Rules in Guidelines for Conduct, 29–30, 37.
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This means that those of us who find Wesley’s model of the Christian journey to holiness
more convincing that the models with which we were raised must do more than simply issue
calls for recovering Wesley’s richer network of means for nurturing Christian holiness. We must
find ways to rekindle an appreciation for the responsive and formative nature of human
moral/spiritual choice and action; in other words, we must recover something more like
Wesley’s affectional moral psychology. Explicit debates about moral psychology were central to
the earlier revisions of Wesley’s model, and will be central to its recovery.
Some awareness of this is evident in the holiness movement’s engagement with the
modern discipline of psychology. Psychology emerged as an independent “scientific” discipline,
freeing itself from its earlier subsumption within philosophy, by focusing particular attention on
the nonrational dimensions of the human psyche. One predictable response to this by holiness
writers, with their rational control emphasis, has been to view psychology as either a dangerous
attempt to explain away sin and moral accountability or an alternative form of healing that
should be roundly denounced as ineffective.88 A few writers have chosen instead to emphasize
those psychologists who define psychological health as an integration of the personality where
emotional attitudes are harmonized and directed to one end, invoking them in support of the
conception of entire sanctification as restored rational control.89 But continuing dialogue with
modern psychology and its emphasis on nonrational dimensions of human motivation has
encouraged moves to qualify the spontaneous rational control emphasis of the classic model of
Christian Perfection. The most common (and conservative) way of doing this has been to invoke
the purity/maturity distinction to separate repressed complexes and other psychological issues
that require long-term counseling to deal with from the “carnal nature” that is instantaneously
cleansed in 
88E.g., John Marvin Hames, Orthodox Psychology (Chicago, IL: Christian Witness, 1929), 3,
32–33, 43–44, 72; J.P. Taylor, Holiness, 97; and the remark quoted approvingly in J. Harold Greenlee,
What the New Testament Says About Holiness (Salem, OH: Schmul, 1994), 50.
89See esp. S.S. White, Eradication, 93–94; and William A. Arnett, “Current Theological
Emphases in the American Holiness Tradition,” Mennonite Quarterly Review 35 (1961): 120–29; here,
128–29.
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entire sanctification.90 Only a few brave souls have suggested connecting entire sanctification
itself integrally with the process of maturation, and these have retained a fairly rationalist model
of maturation.91
The other place that psychological reconsideration has entered recent holiness debates
over sanctification is the use of “relational” psychologies like those of Martin Buber and Gordon
Allport to counter the possible suggestion that inbred sin is some type of material “substance”
that must be removed to free up spontaneous holiness. In relational terms the essential nature of
human fallenness is identified as broken relationships resulting from our egocentricity or self-
sovereignty, and the essence of salvation becomes restored relationships through true
submission. While this is certainly preferable to a materialist alternative, these relationalist
accounts have typically carried over the decisionistic emphases of their existentialist roots.92
Even Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, who has developed the account with the most stress on the need
for growth in holistic relational holiness, gives little attention to the actual dynamics of forming
Christian character (holy tempers), choosing to emphasize instead that holiness is a moment-by-
moment impartation of our growing relationship with God!93
90E.g., W. Curry Mavis, “Repressed Complexes and Christian Maturity,” in The Word and the
Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Wesleyan-Arminian Theology, edited by Kenneth Geiger (Kansas
City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1965), 307–15; Leon & Mildred Chambers, Holiness and Human Nature (Kansas
City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1975; ori. Human Nature and Perfecting Holiness, 1972), 24–27, 48–52; David
Seamands, Healing for Damaged Emotions (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1981), 13–15; Dick Howard, So
Who’s Perfect? A Candid Look at our Humanness (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1985), 45, 97, 103;
and W.T. Purkiser, These Earthen Vessels: The Christian: His Failures, Foibles, and Infirmities (Kansas
City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1985), 55.
91The best example is Leslie Ray Marston, From Chaos to Character: A Study in the Stewardship
of Personality (Winona Lake, IN: Light & Life Press, 1948 [ori., 1935]) [FMC: 1947–51; PH: 1946–66].
92Cf. William M. Greathouse, “A Study of Wesley’s Doctrine of Sin and Perfection as Treated by
Cell, Lee, and Cannon” (Vanderbilt University M.A. thesis, 1948), 70–83; Rob L. Staples, “John
Wesley’s Doctrine of Christian Perfection: A Reinterpretation” (Pacific School of Religion Ph.D. thesis,
1963), esp. viii, 94–98, 121–33; H. Ray Dunning, Grace, Faith and Holiness: A Wesleyan Systematic
Theology (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1988), 297, 472–75, 483; and John A. Knight, All Loves
Excelling: Proclaiming Our Wesleyan Message (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1995), 19, 25–26, 77.
93See Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City,
MO: Beacon Hill, 1972), esp. 88, 206, 232.
64
So, we have some distance to go in recovering Wesley’s affectional moral psychology. It
will not be a simple process, because we must swim against the current of our culture—both in
the church and at large. More importantly, it will not be sufficient simply to reach agreement
among ourselves as theologians, the vital practical-theological task will be finding effective
ways of getting the basic assumptions of an affectional moral psychology renewed “in the
bones” of the sisters and brothers in our communities. It is a daunting challenge, but one well
worth accepting. I invite you to join me in the attempt.
APPENDIX A
ALTERNATIVE MORAL PSYCHOLOGIES
  Determinist Self-determinist
    
       +spontaneous rational control (Socrates?) 
rational primacy       intellectualist (Socrates?)     /habituated rational control (Plato)
       .decisionistic rational control (Kant)
       +spontaneous sentiments (Hutcheson)
volitional holism voluntarist (Hobbes)        /habituated virtues (Aristotle)
       .decisionistic self-assertion (Sartre)
       +spontaneous expressivism (Rousseau)
passional primacy naturalist (Hume)        /habituated expressivism (prudent hedonist)
       .decisionistic expressivism (Nietzsche?)
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APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE CHRISTIAN MORAL PSYCHOLOGIES
  Determinist Self-determinist
    
       +spontaneous rational control (Scholastics?) 
rational primacy intellectualist (Gnostics) /habituated rational control (Clement, etc.)
       .decisionistic rational control (Personalism)
       +spontaneous sentiments (Pietists, Schl.)
volitional holism voluntarist (Augustine,      /habituated virtues (Aquinas, Gregory)
 Luther, Edwards)        .decisionistic self-assertion (Scotus, Kierk.)
       +spontaneous expressivism (libertines)
passional primacy naturalist (?)           /habituated expressivism (?)
       .decisionistic expressivism (?)
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